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The purpose of this thesis was to find out what considerations need to be taken into account when 
providing in vitro diagnostic (IVD) medical device software as a cloud-based service. This thesis 
was commissioned by a health informatics company Wallac Oy, which is part of PerkinElmer Inc.  
 
The theoretical part of the thesis describes the Software as a Service (SaaS) model as well as 
other software distribution models. Benefits and threats of the SaaS model are discussed, and 
different deployment models are presented. 
 
The research was conducted through a literature review. EU regulations, General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), and In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR) and some of the most relevant 
ISO and IEC standards were examined. Important considerations regarding cloud computing 
requirements were identified and standards providing guidance on how to implement security 
controls and protect personally identifiable information were presented. Although there is no 
single certificate of quality system showing the IVD SaaS provider’s compliance to the regulatory 
requirements and the guidances are still developing,  careful documentation instructed by quality 
management system is recommended. Further research is needed, for example, into data 
handling and ownership, requirements of country-specific legislation and technical 
implementation of IVD SaaS. 
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LÄÄKINTÄLAITEOHJELMISTON PALVELUMALLI 
 
Opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli selvittää, millaisia asioita pitää ottaa huomioon, kun in vitro 
diagnostiseen käyttöön tarkoitettua lääkinnällistä ohjelmistoa tarjotaan pilvipohjaisena ja 
tilattavana palvelumallina. Opinnäytetyö on tehty terveysteknologiayritys Wallac Oylle, joka 
kuuluu osaksi PerkinElmer-korporaatiota.  
 
Teoriaosuudessa esitellään pilvipalvelumallit sekä erilaiset toteutustavat, keskittyen erityisesti 
SaaS-malliin, jonka hyödyt ja uhat käydään myös läpi. 
 
Opinnäytetyössä käsitellään kirjallisuuskatsauksen avulla EU:n GDPR- ja IVDR-regulaatioita 
sekä keskeisimpiä ISO- ja IEC-standardeja. Huomioonotettavia asioita pilvitoteutukseen liittyen 
nostetaan esille sekä käsitellään standardeja, jotka tarjoavat ohjeistusta tietoturvaan ja 
henkilötietojen suojaamiseen. Tutkimuksen perusteella on todettava, ettei ole olemassa yhtä 
tiettyä sertifikaattia, jolla IVD-valmistaja pystyisi osoittamaan SaaS-toteutuksen 
vaatimustenmukaisuuden regulaatioihin nähden. Lisäksi ohjeistukset ovat edelleen 
kehitysvaiheessa. Laatujärjestelmän ohjeistama huolellinen dokumentointi on kuitenkin 
suositeltavaa. Jatkotutkimuskohteita ovat esimerkiksi datan hallinta ja omistajuus, maakohtaisten 
lakien vaatimukset sekä IVD SaaS-mallin tekniseen toteutukseen liittyvät asiat. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, cloud computing has become increasingly popular along with the 
Software as a Service (SaaS) model. In short, this allows businesses to operate more 
cost-effectively as time-consuming software installation and configuration projects and 
also hardware maintenance, such as servers, can be traded to a model in which the 
software is subscribed as a service from a cloud-based infrastructure. On the other hand, 
it raises many questions regarding data handling and information security. 
 
Wallac Oy is a health informatics company, part of PerkinElmer (PKI) corporation, which 
develops in vitro diagnostic (IVD) medical device products for prenatal and neonatal 
screening. Prenatal screening is performed during pregnancy for detecting, e.g., trisomy 
and pre-eclampsia risks. Neonatal screening is used for finding possible medical 
conditions and disorders in newborn babies. (www.perkinelmer.com) Wallac 
manufactures all the required components from chemistry reagents to instruments and 
software. So far Wallac’s software has been installed and maintained locally on the 
customers’ systems, but with the current trend the possibilities and requirements of the 
SaaS model need to be explored.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out through a literature review what considerations 
need to be taken into account when providing medical device software as a service. The 
topic is broad and could be inspected from various perspectives, but this thesis focuses 
on what restrictions regulations and standards set in the scope of European Union. 
Chapter 2. describes the SaaS model. Chapter 3. discusses the definition of medical 
device software. Chapter 4. includes the analysis of the material and the requirements 
from a regulatory perspective including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
ISO 13485 medical device quality management system standard, ISO/IEC 27018 and 
29100 information technology standards, IEC 62304 medical device software life cycle 
standard and Regulation for In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices (IVDR). Chapter 5. 
includes conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
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2 SOFTWARE AS A SERVICE (SAAS) 
Software as a Service (SaaS) is a cloud computing-based software distribution model in 
which the software is not considered as a product but rather as a service used on 
demand. The ownership of the software remains on the service provider whose 
responsibilities are the installation, maintenance, and service activities, enabling the 
customer to simply focus on using the software (Järvi et al. 2011, 10).  
 
The following attributes are often associated with the SaaS model: It is available online 
via a web browser or light client software and independently for the user as a self-service 
without significant input from the service provider. The resources are centralized and the 
applications are run on the service providers’ or on their partners’ servers. Multitenancy 
allows one software instance to serve multiple customers simultaneously. The service 
can quickly be scaled up or down if needed. Billing can be carried out based on the actual 
use, for example the number of users, used resources or usage time. Cloud service can 
monitor the use and thus bring transparency to service. (Järvi et al. 2011, 10) 
 
Traditionally the use of software in businesses has been based on the on-premise model 
in which the company purchases a number of software licenses and servers and the IT 
department installs and configures the software to be run in the company’s intranet. In 
the Application Service Provider (ASP) model, the servers, software ownership, and 
maintenance are outsourced to a third party, the ASP service provider, and the software 
is used online. This relieves the IT department’s workload as its own servers are no 
longer required. However, the servers still need to be dedicated to a certain software and 
customer. The actual software use from the customer’s perspective is quite similar in 
ASP and SaaS models, but the benefictiary in the SaaS model is the possibility for 
multitenancy. Instead of various different applications, the service provider only 
maintains a single application which serves all the customers. This reduces the service 
provider’s maintenance workload and through the improved maintenance and business 
logic the benefits reach the customer as well. (Järvi et al. 2011, 11) 
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2.1 Benefits and threats from the customer and service provider standpoints 
Järvi et al. (2011, 12–15) performed a SWOT analysis on SaaS from both the customer 
and manufacturer perspectives. From the customer point of view the strengths of SaaS 
are: less need for own IT’s maintenance work, time and place independence via browser 
use, billing can be based on actual use, quick and low-risk acquisition,  flexible scalability, 
easier update process and possibly better information security. The weaknesses are: 
less control and customization, dependency on the service provider which can be less 
accessible and provide standard contracts for numerous customers and no possibility for 
offline use. The opportunities that the SaaS provides for the customer are: reduced cost, 
extended application selection because of the cost-effectiveness, more focus on core 
competence because less resources are needed for application acquisition and 
maintenance, risk-free trial possibility, reduced attachment to a specific service provider, 
working self-service and good value for money. The threats, on the other hand, are: more 
difficult to acquire integration projects, information security regarding, for example data 
handling, legal issues, for example regarding data locations, changes in the service or 
its availability, lack of local IT support and possible disconnects. (Järvi et al. 2011, 12–
13) 
 
When compared to the traditional on-premise model, the SaaS model has the following 
strengths for the service provider: vast group of potential customers, low costs per 
customer, direct contact with the customer, simpler application development, version 
control and maintenance and quick business cycles. The weaknesses are: possibly 
delayed cash flow due to the flexible pricing, global competition, high cost for customer 
acquisition when compared to the product’s price and weaker customer lock-in (customer 
dependency on a vendor for products and services). The possibilities include: scalable 
business model, possibility for viral growth, quick access to global markets, possibility 
for low-risk entrepreneurship through lack of advance costs, R&D savings, faster 
feedback cycle and utilization of the user community. The threats that the SaaS model 
poses for the service provider include: customer concern for information security and 
reliability, in global competition the product can be easily copied, the customer value is 
reduced and differences in domain and development model when compared to on-
premise model. (Järvi et al. 2011, 14–15) 
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2.2 Service and deployment models 
So far this thesis has discussed the SaaS model in which the service provider produces 
the application and the cloud infrastructure which it is run on and the user operates for 
example via a web browser, but other models for cloud computing exist as well. The 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) model provides the customer with the ability to deploy 
applications based on the tools supported by the service provider. The customer has 
more control and responsibility on the applications and configuration than on the SaaS 
model. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) simply provides the cloud computing 
infrastructure for computing resources, but the customer is able to deploy arbitrary 
software. (Mell & Grance 2011, 2–3)  
The cloud infrastructure can also be deployed in various ways. A private cloud is used 
exclusively by a single organization. A community cloud consists of community of 
organizations which have shared requirements. A public cloud is open to be used by the 
general public. Private and community clouds can exist on or off customer premises, but 
the public cloud is on the premises of the cloud provider. In addition, the hybrid cloud is 
a composition of two or more of the above-mentioned cloud infrastructures. (Mell & 
Grance 2011, 3) Even though a private cloud is used by a single organization, it is not 
necessarily owned or managed by the user but it can belong to another third party. The 
public cloud is owned by a service provider which specializes in supplying systems to 
users, businesses and administrative bodies. (de Hert et al. 2016, 20) 
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3 MEDICAL DEVICE AND MEDICAL DEVICE 
SOFTWARE 
Wallac’s quality management system (QMS) is based on ISO 13485:2016, a standard 
created by International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ISO is discussed in 
further detail below in Section 4.2. ISO 13485:2016 defines  the requirements for a 
comprehensive quality management system for the design and manufacture of medical 
devices. While ISO 13485:2016 is a stand-alone standard, it is based on standard ISO 
9001:2015 Quality management systems — Requirements (ISO 13485:2016, 67). ISO 
13485:2016 defines medical device as “instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
appliance, implant, reagent for in vitro use, software, material or other similar or related 
article, intended by the manufacturer to be used, alone or in combination, for human 
beings, for one or more of the specific medical purpose(s) of: 
- diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease; 
- diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury; 
- investigation, replacement, modification, or support of the anatomy or of a 
physiological process; 
- supporting or sustaining life; 
- control of conception; 
- disinfection of medical devices; 
- providing information by means of in vitro examination of specimens derived from 
the human body; 
and does not achieve its primary intended action by pharmacological, immunological or 
metabolic means, in or on the human body, but which may be assisted in its intended 
function by such means” (ISO 13485:2016, 70–71). The same definition for medical 
device is also shared by the World Health Organization (WHO) (www.who.int). 
 
Medical Device Coordination Group (MDCG) defines medical device software as 
“software that is intended to be used, alone or in combination, for a purpose as specified 
in the definition of a “medical device” in the medical devices regulation or in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices regulation” (MDCG 2019-11, 6). Becchetti & Neri (2013, 361–
362) describe medical software in general to be stand-alone software for diagnostic or 
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therapeutic purposes, software component such as embedded software in a medical 
device, software which drives a device or influences the use or software that is accessory 
of a medical device.  
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4 ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 General Data Protection Regulation 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), privacy and security law, 
was put into effect on May 25, 2018 with the goal to give individuals better control over 
the data they provide to organizations as data subjects. Violating GDPR can cause fines 
up to 20 million euros or 4% of global revenue, depending which is higher. 
(https://gdpr.eu)  Organizations from all over the world may need to follow GDPR if they 
provide services to EU data subjects (ITGP Privacy Team 2017, 29). GDPR requires a 
Data Protection Officer (DPO) within an organization with the responsibility of ensuring 
the organization’s GDPR compliance. According to GDPR, data processing is any 
automated or manual action performed on a data, data controller is the person who 
decides how and why personal data is processed and data processor is a third party that 
processes personal data on the data controller’s behalf. (https://gdpr.eu)  
 
One of the specific processes of GDPR is the data protection impact assessment (DPIA), 
which is required for many organizations. DPIAs are used for identifying what specific 
risks data processing can cause to personal data (ITGP Privacy Team 2017, 121). First 
step of identifying the need for a DPIA is to determine whether it is required by the law 
or if the organization’s needs demand it (ITGP Privacy Team 2017, 125). According to 
Article 35, Clause 3 of GDPR, DPIA shall in particular be required in the case of: 
(a) a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural 
persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on 
which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural 
person or similarly significantly affect the natural person; 
(b) processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 
9(1), or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to 
in Article 10; or 
(c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale. 
(https://gdpr-info.eu/art-35-gdpr/) 
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According to GDPR Recital 84, “where processing operations are likely to result in a high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller should be responsible 
for the carrying-out of a data protection impact assessment to evaluate, in particular, the 
origin, nature, particularity and severity of that risk.” ITGP Privacy Team (2017, 173–174) 
sum up the desired outcomes of a DPIA: “a description of the processing and its 
purposes, the legitimate interests you are pursuing with this processing, an assessment 
of the necessity and proportionality of the processing, an assessment of the risks to the 
rights and freedoms of data subjects, the measures envisaged to address the risks, all 
of the safeguards and security measures to demonstrate compliance with the Regulation, 
indications of timeframes if the processing will include erasure of personal data, an 
indication of any data protection by design and by default measures, a list of the 
recipients of personal data, compliance with approved codes of conduct, details of 
whether the data subjects have consulted and have been consented.”  
 
Focusing on the SaaS perspective, when cloud computing is involved, organizations may 
be facing the matter of transferring personal data to a country outside the EU/EEA and 
according to GDPR, it can only be performed under two specific conditions: 
1. The destination has been the subject of an adequacy decision. 
2. The transfer is subject to appropriate safeguards to protect the personal data 
(ITGP Privacy Team 2017, 250–251) 
The Commission of the European Union makes adequacy decisions for countries or 
organizations which are acceptable destinations of transferring personal data. (ITGP 
Privacy Team 2017, 252). It should be noted that the United States is not included in the 
list of countries with adequacy decisions partly because the United States does not have 
a national data protection law. Most states have their own data protection laws providing 
varying levels of consumer protection and special arrangements are in place between 
the United States and EU in order to make data transfers possible (ITGP Privacy Team 
2017, 253). If cloud provider is used for processing personal data, the organization needs 
to confirm the location of the data centers where the data is stored (ITGP Privacy Team 
2017, 262).  
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Many of cloud providers’ service farms will qualify as international organizations and 
therefore appropriate safeguards are needed for protecting personal data. If cloud 
providers do not have enough control over the circumstances where the actual data is 
stored or secure assurances from the other involved parties, it is advised to change the 
provider or develop inhouse capacity for replacing the cloud service. In addition, if cloud 
services store data in a third country, the controllers will have to follow the Regulation’s 
usual requirements on international data transfer, including justifying the reason for the 
transfer, applying controls and measures for protecting the personal data and informing 
data subjects of the data transfer. ISO/IEC 27018:2014 standard provides a good starting 
point for protecting personal data which is hosted in the cloud by presenting a set of 
additional controls to protect personal information and guidance on implementing them. 
(ITGP Privacy Team 2017, 262–263) The standard has since been revised to ISO/IEC 
27018:2019. 
 
GDPR grants data subjects rights to request the erasure of information (Article 17) or 
copies of the personal data (Article 20). This needs to be taken into account when 
determining data control and management matters especially if the cloud is acquired 
from a third party service provider. It should also be noted that GDPR states that if the 
personal data has been pseudonymized, i.e. artificial identifiers, or pseudonyms, have 
been used in such a way that personal data cannot be attributed to a data subject without 
using additional information, the data still falls under the scope of GDPR. However, 
GDPR does not apply if the personal data has been irreversibly made anonymous in 
such a way that the data subject can no longer be identified. According to Recital 16, 
GDPR is not applicable to activities regarding national and common security. 
 
4.2 The ISO and IEC International Standards 
The International Organization for Standardization or ISO is an independent, non-
governmental international organization which was founded in 1946. The goal was “to 
facilitate the international coordination and unification of industrial standards” 
(www.iso.org). Today ISO has a membership of 164 national standards bodies and it has 
published over 23090 International Standards on aspects of manufacturing and 
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technology. The standards are created for ensuring product and service quality and to 
provide strategic tools for businesses. They are developed through an international 
consensus process by experts who represent various sectors. (www.iso.org) 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a not-for-profit, quasi-governmental 
organization which was founded in 1906. IEC publishes “consensus-based International 
Standards and manages conformity assessment systems for electric and electronic 
products, systems and services, collectively known as electrotechnology.” (www.iec.ch) 
 
Given the extensive number of various standards, a comprehensive study is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Instead, the aim is to highlight standards that are relevant to Wallac 
as an IVD1 manufacturer from SaaS point of view and they are discussed in the following 
sections. Table 1. below lists those standards. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Standards. 
ID Title Purpose 
ISO 13485 Medical devices — Quality 
management systems — 
Requirements for regulatory 
purposes 
Specifies requirements for a quality management 
system where an organization needs to 
demonstrate its ability to provide medical devices 
and related services that consistently meet 
customer and applicable regulatory requirements. 
(www.iso.org) 
ISO/IEC 
27018 
Information technology — Security 
techniques — Code of practice for 
protection of personally 
identifiable information (PII) in 
public clouds acting as PII 
processors 
Establishes commonly accepted control objectives, 
controls and guidelines for implementing measures 
to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII)  
in accordance with the privacy principles in ISO/IEC 
29100 for the public cloud computing environment. 
(www.iso.org) 
ISO/IEC 
29100 
Information technology — Security 
techniques — Privacy framework 
Provides a privacy framework which specifies a 
common privacy terminology, defines the actors and 
their roles in processing personally identifiable 
information (PII), describes privacy safeguarding 
considerations and provides references to known 
 
1 In Vitro Diagnostics, “tests done on samples such as blood or tissue that have been taken from 
the human body” (www.fda.gov). 
16 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Juho Alhola 
privacy principles for information technology. 
(www.iso.org) 
IEC 62304 Medical device software — 
Software life cycle processes 
Defines the life cycle requirements for medical 
device software. The set of processes, activities, 
and tasks described in this standard establishes a 
common framework for medical device software life 
cycle processes. (www.iso.org) 
 
 
4.2.1 ISO 13485  
As mentioned above, Wallac’s quality management system (QMS) is based on ISO 
13485:2016. For medical device manufacturers ISO 13485 is one way of showing 
compliance to multiple countries’ legislation regarding medical device and IVD 
manufacturing. ISO 13485:2016 “specifies requirements for a quality management 
system that can be used by an organization involved in one or more stages of the life-
cycle of a medical device, including design and development, production, storage and 
distribution, installation, servicing and final decommissioning and disposal of medical 
devices, and design and development, or provision of associated activities (e.g. technical 
support)” (ISO 13485:2016, 65).  
 
ISO 13485 states that “Design and development validation shall be performed in 
accordance with planned and documented arrangements to ensure that the resulting 
product is capable of meeting the requirements for the specified application or intended 
use” (ISO 13485:2016, 82). This raises a question concerning third party cloud providers. 
If the cloud computing platform is not maintained by the medical device software 
manufacturer themselves, but instead acquired from a third party provider, how can it be 
ensured that the product still meets the requirements if the cloud vendor decides to apply 
updates and what control the manufacturer can have over these updates?  
 
Section 4.1.5. of ISO 13485 requires that “When the organization chooses to outsource 
any process that affects product conformity to requirements, it shall monitor and ensure 
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control over such processes. The organization shall retain responsibility of conformity to 
this International Standard and to customer and applicable regulatory requirements for 
outsourced processes” (ISO 13485:2016, 73). In addition, section 6.3. requires that “The 
organization shall document requirements for the maintenance activities, including the 
interval of performing the maintenance activities, when such maintenance activities, or 
lack thereof, can affect product quality” (ISO 13485:2016, 73). When taking these into 
account, it becomes evident that if third party cloud provider is used, transparency of its 
processes is required. In all, ISO 13485 raises questions and concerns regarding cloud 
computing, but it as such does not provide resolutions. Thus we shall inspect more 
specialized standards, which can complement ISO 13485 and provide assistive 
frameworks for complying with regulatory and legislative requirements. 
 
4.2.2 ISO/IEC 27018 
ISO/IEC 27018, mentioned above in Section 4.1., is built on two older information 
security management standards ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002. It is a sector-
specific standard which gives guidance to cloud service providers (CSP) who handle 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and the standard provides controls to them for 
addressing specific risks of cloud computing, of which two common risks are lack of 
control over the data and inadequate transparency. (de Hert et al. 2016, 22) ISO/IEC 
27018 assists the CSP as PII processor in showing compliance with contractual or legal 
obligations, but it also aims to address the customer’s concerns when considering 
suitable providers and making contracts with them. If the cloud provider is certified with 
the standard, the customer gets a degree of assurance that the service is well-governed 
and meets the legal responsibilities regarding PII processing. (de Hert et al. 2016, 23) 
 
The term “personally identifiable information” in ISO/IEC 27018 is borrowed from US, but 
it does not fully match US guidance or normative documents. The standard defines the 
term PII in section 3.2. as “any information that (a) can be used to identify the PII principal 
to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a PII 
principal”. (de Hert et al. 2016, 24) GDPR states that  
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“The data subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, 
especially by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or one of several special characteristics, which 
expresses the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, commercial, cultural or social 
identity of these natural persons. In practice, these also include all data which are or 
can be assigned to a person in any kind of way. For example, the telephone, credit 
card or personnel number of a person, account data, number plate, appearance, 
customer number or address are all personal data.”  
 (https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/personal-data/) 
EU’s scope seems to be wider: while the standard concerns information that “can be 
used” or “linked” to a PII principal (data subject), the EU definition covers any information 
relating to an identifiable natural person, including cases where information is not directly 
or indirectly linked to a natural person but might still identify a person. The CSP’s and 
customers should keep in mind that the standard does not cover all possible cases where 
the data controller needs to be compliant with the legislation. (de Hert et al. 2016, 24) 
 
The ISO/IEC 27018 contains a large set of controls for various information security 
policies and the purpose is that the cloud provider as PII processor enables the customer 
as PII controller to follow the legal data protection requirements. As with EU legislation, 
the purposes for collecting and processing personal data must be determined explicitly 
and legitimately and further processing should also be compatible with the original 
purposes. (de Hert et al. 2016, 25) Controls also obligate the cloud provider to inform the 
customer on legally binding requests, its subcontractors and possible storage locations 
of PII. In addition, the provider is prohibited from processing PII for marketing and 
commercial purposes. (de Hert et al. 2016, 26) 
 
The ISO/IEC 27018 addresses many but not all of EU’s data protection obligations and 
principles and cloud clients also probably need to do Privacy Impact Assessment to 
better identify and mitigate the risks in data protection (de Hert et al. 2016, 27). It is not 
realistic to develop a harmonized standard that would cover legal requirements 
everywhere in the world  and the decision to limit the scope of ISO/IEC 27018 to fields it 
can realistically cover and add value to its addressees is rational. The ISO/IEC 27018 
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does not claim to substitute data protection laws but rather it provides a framework of 
controls which assists in complying with the legislation. It should also be noted that the 
ISO/IEC 27018  is not a stand-alone standard but builds on earlier privacy and security 
related ISO standards such as ISO/IEC 29100, ISO/IEC 27002:2013 and ISO/IEC:27001 
by specifically focusing on aspects of cloud computing (de Hert et al. 2016, 28). 
 
4.2.3 ISO/IEC 29100  
The ISO/IEC 29100 provides a privacy framework which “specifies a common privacy 
terminology, defines the actors and their roles in processing personally identifiable 
information (PII), describes privacy safeguarding considerations and provides references 
to known privacy principles for information technology” (ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 1). 
ISO/IEC 29100 identifies four types of actors related to processing of PII: PII principals 
who provide the information (such as employee in a human resources system, consumer 
in a credit report or patient in an electronic health record), PII controllers who determine 
why and how PII processing is conducted, PII processors who carry out processing of 
PII on behalf or under instructions of PII controller and third parties who can receive PII 
from a PII controller or a PII processor. Third parties do not process PII on behalf of PII 
controllers, but rather can become PII controllers on their own rights when they receive 
PII. (ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 5–6)   
 
PII controllers and processors ability to identify PII principals can be restricted with 
pseudonymizing the data with the use of aliases. Linkability can be retained with 
pseudonymization whereas anonymization removes linkability and anonymized data is 
then no longer PII (ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 9). Managing risks related to privacy can be 
affected by four types of factors: legal and regulatory factors arising from international 
and national legislation and regulations, contractual factors such as company policies 
and agreements between different actors, business factors such as industry guidelines 
and codes of conduct and other factors which can include for example PII principal’s 
privacy preferences, internal control systems and technical standards. (ISO/IEC 
29100:2011, 11–12)  Organizations should create and document internal privacy policy 
for safeguarding the processing of PII but also external privacy policy for providing 
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outsiders a notice of the organization’s privacy practices. Privacy controls should be 
established and documented as part of the organization’s privacy risk assessment. 
(ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 13)    
 
ISO/IEC 29100 provides a list of privacy principles which should be considered when 
designing, developing and implementing privacy policies and privacy controls: Consent 
and choice, PII principals should be able to choose how their PII is handled and easily 
withdraw consent if so desired. Purpose legitimacy and specification, ensure that PII 
collection purposes comply with applicable laws and that the purposes are 
communicated to the PII before collection. Collection limitation, only strictly necessary 
PII should be collected and within bounds of applicable laws. Data minimization, this is 
linked to the preceding collection limitation, but whereas collection limitation refers to 
limited data collection to specified purpose, data minimization minimizes the processing 
of PII with designing and implementing appropriate data processing procedures and 
systems. Use, retention and disclosure limitation, all unnecessary use and transfer of PII 
should be limited. Accuracy and Quality, PII processing needs to be done accurately and 
be relevant for the purpose of use. Openness, transparency and notice, PII principals 
should be provided with clear and easily accessible information of the PII processing 
policies, procedures and practices. Individual participation and access, PII principals 
should have access to review their PII. Accountability, this includes notifying all relevant 
parties of possible privacy breaches and if PII is transferred to third parties, it is ensured 
through contractual or other means that the third party recipient adheres to providing an 
equivalent level of privacy. Information security, following an information security 
principle in which appropriate controls and PII processors are chosen. Privacy 
compliance, privacy risk assessments are developed and maintained for assessing 
compliance with privacy requirements and data protection and safeguarding methods 
are periodically audited. (ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 14–19)   
 
4.2.4 IEC 62304 
IEC 62304:2006 provides a framework of life cycle processes for safely designing and 
maintaining medical device software. Processes are further divided into activities and 
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tasks. (IEC 62304:2006, 11) The processes for medical device software described in the 
framework include development, maintenance, risk management, configuration 
management and problem resolution. Amendment A1 for IEC 62304 was released in 
2015 in order to add requirements for handling legacy software, software design 
preceding the current software version. According to IEC 62304, the manufacturer needs 
to apply a risk management process and assign software systems to safety classes: 
Class A: No injury or damage to health is possible, Class B: Non-serious injury is possible 
or Class C: Death or serious injury is possible (IEC 62304:2006, 29). The software safety 
class then determines which processes, activities and tasks described in the standard 
need to be followed in order to comply with the standard.  
 
IEC 62304 discusses SOUP, software of unknown provenance, which is “SOFTWARE 
ITEM that is already developed and generally available and that has not been developed 
for the purpose of being incorporated into the MEDICAL DEVICE (also known as “off-
the-shelf software”) or SOFTWARE ITEM previously developed for which adequate 
records of the development PROCESSES are not available” (IEC 62304:2006, 27, IEC 
62304:2006/A1:2015, 6). A question arises that if the software is designed to operate in 
a cloud, can a cloud service provided by a third party CSP be seen as SOUP or off-the-
shelf (OTS) software? If the answer is yes, there are a number of activities that need to 
be followed related to SOUP. In the software development plan, the manufacturer needs 
to include a plan on how SOUP items are integrated and test them during integration and 
assessment of SOUP related risk management needs to also be included (IEC 
62304:2006, 33). In the software architectural design, functional and performance 
requirements for a SOUP item must be specified along with the hardware and software 
needed for supporting that the SOUP item is properly operated and this needs to be 
verified as well (IEC 62304:2006, 39–41). The software maintenance plan needs to have, 
among other items, procedures for evaluating the obsolescence of SOUP IEC 
62304:2006, 51).  
 
For the risk management process, the manufacturer has to identify potential causes 
contributing to a hazardous situation. This includes failure or unexpected results from 
SOUP and if such potential causes are identified, for Class B and C software the 
manufacturer needs to evaluate any anomaly list published by the SOUP supplier to 
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assess if known anomalies may lead into hazardous situation through sequence of 
events (IEC 62304:2006, 55). If changes to medical device software, including SOUP,  
are made, the manufacturer has to analyze if additional potential contributing causes of 
hazardous situation are found and if additional risk control measures are required for the 
software (IEC 62304:2006, 59).  
 
4.3 In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation 2017/746 
EU Regulation for In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices (2017/746), or IVDR, has come 
into force on May 26, 2017 and it has a five-year transition period, applying fully to EU 
countries from May 26, 2022. Article 2 (2) of IVDR defines in vitro diagnostic medical 
device as:  
“any medical device which is a reagent, reagent product, calibrator, control material, 
kit, instrument, apparatus, piece of equipment, software or system, whether used 
alone or in combination, intended by the manufacturer to be used in vitro for the 
examination of specimens, including blood and tissue donations, derived from the 
human body, solely or principally for the purpose of providing information on one or 
more of the following:  
(a) concerning a physiological or pathological process or state;  
(b) concerning congenital physical or mental impairments;  
(c) concerning the predisposition to a medical condition or a disease;  
(d) to determine the safety and compatibility with potential recipients;  
(e) to predict treatment response or reactions;  
(f) to define or monitoring therapeutic measures.” 
  
IVDR replaces the preceding EU Directive (98/79/EC) and it aims to improve quality, 
safety and reliability as well as classification and definitions of IVDs. Because IVDR is a 
Regulation instead of a Directive, it is binding for all EU countries without requiring 
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transposition to national law and it seeks to ensure a more effective implementation of 
the rules on IVDs. It will have stricter requirements for post-market vigilance reporting 
and surveillance in order to better align the IVD regulation with medicines in the EU. 
IVDR seeks to raise standards and increase regulatory scope with two key changes: 
Firstly, IVDR has a broader definition of IVD devices, including software or system which 
involve algorithms and are used in in vitro diagnostic examination of specimens. 
Secondly, IVDR introduces a new risk based classification with four classes, Class A 
(lowest risk), B, C and D (highest risk). The preceding EU Directive has required most 
medical purpose algorithms qualified as IVD to be CE marked via self-assessment by 
the manufacturer or developer, but IVDR will classify most IVDs which include algorithms 
to higher risk classes. This means that instead of self-assessment, involvement of 
Notified Bodies, independent certification bodies, is required. (www.phgfoundation.org) 
 
Article 6(1) of IVDR states that “A device offered by means of information society 
services, as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535, to a natural 
or legal person established in the Union shall comply with this Regulation”. The definition 
in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 is as follows: 
‘service’ means any Information Society service, that is to say, any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual 
request of a recipient of services.  
For the purposes of this definition:  
(i) ‘at a distance’ means that the service is provided without the parties being 
simultaneously present;  
(ii) ‘by electronic means’ means that the service is sent initially and received at its 
destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including 
digital compression) and storage of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed 
and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic 
means;  
(iii) ‘at the individual request of a recipient of services’ means that the service is 
provided through the transmission of data on individual request. 
Thus, SaaS can be qualified as Information Society service and IVDR is applicable to 
SaaS. Therefore a conclusion can be made that the same requirements described in 
24 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Juho Alhola 
IVDR apply when the IVD medical device is purchased by the customer as a product as 
well as when it is subscribed as a service with the SaaS model. MDCG 2019-11 
(Guidance on Qualification and Classification of Software in Regulation (EU) 2017/745 
– MDR and Regulation (EU) 2017/746 – IVDR) clarifies that medical device software can 
be placed on the market or put into service in its own right or as an integral component 
of a device (MDCG 2019-11, 16–17) and that: “Software may be qualified as MDSW 
regardless of its location (e.g. operating in the cloud, on a computer, on a mobile phone, 
or as an additional functionality on a hardware medical device)” (MDCG 2019-11, 7). 
 
MDCG 2019-16 aims to provide guidance to manufacturers on how to meet the IVDR’s 
essential requirements regarding cybersecurity. An important thing that the document 
points out regarding cloud environment is that “If the operating environment is not 
exclusively local but involves external hosting providers, the documentation must clearly 
state what, where and how data is stored, as well as any security controls to safeguard 
the data in the cloud environment (e.g. encryption)” (MDCG 2019-16, 27).  
 
According to MDCG 2019-16, medical device’s operating environment is defined as any 
IT or network asset which is interacting with the device that is not supplied by the 
manufacturer of the medical device (MDCG 2019-16, 20). Therefore list of general 
security requirements for operating environment provided by MDCG 2019-16 can be 
considered applicable to cloud environment as well. The full list of requirements is 
included as Appendix 1 of this thesis, but the requirements include the operator’s 
compliance with national and EU regulations (e.g. GDPR), physical security, appropriate 
security controls, control and security of network traffic, appropriate security measures 
for the workstations and patch management. Also, the operating environment shall not 
impair the specified performance of the medical device and interoperability between 
interacting elements should be ensured. (MDCG 2019-16, 21–22) 
 
In addition to the list of general requirements for the operating environment, MDCG 2019-
16 also provides an additional list of IT security requirements for the operating 
environment in relation to Annex I of IVDR (MDCG 2019-16, 35). The full list is included 
as Appendix 2, but items that should be highlighted are the need to establish a backup 
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policy and the need to develop a disaster recovery plan. The matters of backup and 
recovery are important questions regarding data management and the policies should 
be carefully planned and documented with the cloud service provider. 
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5 CONCLUSION  
Medical device and IVD regulation for SaaS is scattered to many locations, and there is 
no global view on how the IVD SaaS should be managed. Guidelines are still being 
developed, and manufacturers should keep a close eye on the field, and follow the recent 
developments in the regulatory field. In order to transition to a service provider, the 
manufacturer needs to ensure the processes and controls are created and maintained 
to secure the safety and effectiveness of the service, including data and PII security. As 
the IVD SaaS falls under IVDR, the services provided are also, in addition to the software, 
under the post market surveillance procedures. If a third party cloud service provider is 
used, updates and maintenance of the platform need to be conducted in a controlled 
manner. 
 
A single certificate of quality system showing the IVD SaaS provider’s compliance to the 
requirements does not yet exist, as there are multiple ISO standards and local laws that 
service providers need to conform to. A good start for IVDR compliance is to follow the  
ISO 13485 Quality Management System, which requires documented processes. Among 
the processes that need to be well documented are installation, maintenance, service 
and data access and management. Information technology standards provide guidance 
on how to implement security controls and protect personally identifiable information. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this topic can be examined from various perspectives. 
Suggestions for further research could include, for example, a closer look on data 
handling and ownership. This thesis has discussed EU regulations, but country-specific 
local laws should be examined, too. Furthermore, purely technical aspects of IVD Saas, 
such as data encryption and backup procedures, could be investigated as well. 
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Appendix 1. 
MDCG 2019-16: General security requirements for operating environment 
The following indicative list of IT security requirements is suggested for the operating 
environment of medical devices. The exact requirements should be defined by the 
medical device manufacturer on a per case basis, since not all security measures are 
systematically applicable in all contexts. 
- The operator must be in line with national and EU regulations (e.g. GDPR). 
- The operating environment must provide physical security for the medical 
device via security measures such as: 
• Regulated and authenticated physical access enforced via 
suitable technical measures (e.g. badges) 
• Physical security policy defining roles and access rights, including 
for physical access to the medical device 
• Use of segregated, secure areas with appropriate access controls 
- The operating environment must include appropriate security controls such as: 
• User access management (credentials for accessing software 
applications or devices, user access policy, etc.) 
• Antivirus / anti-malware software 
• Firewall 
• Application whitelisting / system hardening 
• Exclusive use of genuine software and ban of all illegitimate 
software and applications 
• Session management measures (e.g. session timeouts) 
- The operating environment must provide control and security of network 
traffic via appropriate measures, such as: 
• Network segmentation 
• Traffic filtering 
• Data encryption 
- Specifically for the workstations connected to the medical device, appropriate 
security measures may include: 
• Operating system hardening and application whitelisting 
• Memory protection measures to block arbitrary code execution 
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• Compatibility of medical device management software with 
security solutions that counter malicious code 
• Use of strong passwords 
• Install only software programmes necessary for the intended use 
of the operating environment. 
- For cases when the operating environment is a complex system integrating 
multiple medical devices and other systems, appropriate measures to limit the 
propagation of an attack may include: 
• Partitioning mechanisms and network / traffic segmentation 
• Software integrity checks and device authentication mechanisms 
- To ensure that the security posture of the operating environment and of the 
device itself remain at a suitable level, appropriate provisions regarding patch 
management should be in place, such as: 
• The operating environment should support patching without 
compromising interoperability/compatibility 
• The operator should have appropriate patch management 
processes to ensure that security patches for medical devices are 
deployed in a timely manner 
• The operator should have appropriate patch management 
processes to ensure that the operating environment (e.g. 
operating systems, applications) is up-to-date in terms of security 
- Elements of the operating environment interacting with (e.g. other devices) or 
required for the operation of medical devices (e.g. OS) should ensure 
interoperability and shall not impair the specified performance of the 
medical device 
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Appendix 2. 
MDCG 2019-16: IT security requirements for the operating environment 
- Conduct a risk assessment and impact assessment. Introduction of medical 
devices in the environment should be subject to such a risk assessment. 
- A set of baseline IT security policies should be defined, approved by 
management and communicated to employees and relevant external parties. 
Examples of such policies include: 
• Define clear roles for users of critical systems and medical 
devices, segregate duties 
• Define information classification levels and label devices handling 
such information accordingly 
• Acceptable use policy 
• Password policy 
• Change Management policy 
• Establish a backup policy on selected critical systems. 
• Establish a vendor/procurement policy for the provision of medical 
equipment. 
• Include proper SLAs and NDAs to vendors and external 
associates 
- Provide security awareness training for employees that operate critical devices 
and systems and make background checks prior to authorizing access to key 
personnel. 
- Catalogue assets in an inventory of all medical devices, servers and 
workstations. 
• Assign unique ID’s to healthcare information systems, medical 
devices. 
- Monitor and keep track of changes in ecosystem parties, so that business 
processes are not interrupted or hide risks. 
- Apply the principle of least privilege to user workstations and connected devices. 
• Least privileges must also take into account data minimisation per 
role. 
- Data integrity should be ensured e.g. through hashing, integrity checks. 
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- Establish appropriate security measures for the use of mobile devices and 
teleworking. 
- The Health Information System (HIS) must be able to monitor the correct 
operation of the equipment. 
• Monitor device behaviour in the context of medical workflows. 
- Implement data recovery mechanisms to restore data from critical systems 
- Investigate major incidents and review actions taken to mitigate and reduce time 
to react to future occurrences. 
- Develop a disaster recovery plan, taking into account the minimum recovery 
requirements. 
- Avoid the use of End of life third-party components and devices on the operating 
environment, where possible take additional measures such as network isolation. 
 
